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Résumé: Les enchères multi-unitaires sont un outil potentiellement intéressant de réallocation des droits 
d’usage de l’eau car elles évitent le problème du « lumpy bid ». En revanche, la théorie sur les enchères 
multi-unitaires ne permet pas d’identifier les stratégies optimales des enchérisseurs (car il existe une 
multiplicité des équilibres) et ne fournit donc que des indications partielles sur les formats d’enchère les 
plus performants. Les études empiriques et expérimentales complètent notre connaissance mais elles sont 
relativement rares, limitées à des cas simples (deux enchérisseurs, deux unités) et démontrent que les 
enchérisseurs ont une rationalité limitée et apprennent à améliorer leur stratégie par l’expérience et la 
répétition. Ce papier construit un modèle de simulation multi-agents pour comparer  la performance de 
différents formats d’enchères inversées (prix uniforme, discriminant et Vickrey généralisé) lorsque les 
enchérisseurs soumettent des fonctions d’offre continues et apprennent à ajuster leur stratégie pour 
améliorer leurs gains nets (algorithme d’apprentissage par renforcement de Roth et Erev). Nous 
démontrons que, conformément à la théorie, le format Vickrey généralisé implique les stratégies les plus 
sincères et nous confirmons la réduction de demande dans le cas des enchères uniformes et discriminantes. 
Notre étude démontre les contributions potentielles à la recherche dans ce domaine d’une approche de 
simulation multi-agents et nous permet de formuler des recommandations sur la mise en place d’enchères 
multi-unitaires.  
Mots clé : enchères multi-unitaires, apprentissage, simulation multi-agent, allocation de l’eau 
 
Abstract : Multi-unit auctions are promising mechanisms for the reallocation of water. The main advantage 
of such auctions is to avoid the lumpy bid issue. However, there is great uncertainty about the best auction 
formats when multi-unit auctions are used. The theory can only supply the structural properties of 
equilibrium strategies and the multiplicity of equilibria makes comparisons across auction formats difficult.  
Empirical studies and experiments have improved our knowledge of multi-unit auctions but they remain 
scarce and most experiments are restricted to two bidders and two units. Moreover, they demonstrate that 
bidders have limited rationality  and learn through experience. This paper constructs an agent-based model 
of bidders to compare the performance of alternative auction formats under circumstances where bidders 
submit continuous bid supply functions and learn over time to adjust their bids to improve their net incomes 
(reinforcement learning of Roth and Erev). We demonstrate that under the generalized Vickrey, simulated 
bids converge towards truthful bids as predicted by the theory and that bid shading is the rule for the 
uniform auction. Our study allows us to assess the potential gains from agent-based modelling approaches 
in the assessment of the dynamic performance of multi-unit procurement auctions. Some recommendations 
on the desirable format of water auctions are drawn.  
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*Ecole Nationale Supérieure d’Agronomie de Montpellier, LAMETA. This research was conducted 
when S. Thoyer was working at UWA (SARE) as an invited academic 
**School of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia 
   2
Introduction 
Preserving minimal instream flows in rivers for environmental and recreational purposes may 
entail the permanent (when river water is over-allocated) or transitory (in the case of droughts)  
reduction of water allocation to farmers. It can take the form of compulsory curtailments with a 
negotiated compensation or it can be voluntarily traded between irrigators and the public agency 
in which environmental interests are vested. The second option has been implemented in various 
contexts in the US through auctions to acquire water rights, mostly on a short-term basis 
(Cummings et al, 2002). 
 
This article analyses the use of auctions to allocate water scarcity between farmers and explores 
the scope for multi-unit auctions as an alternative to other existing irrigation auction designs. 
Multi-unit or multiple unit auctions are auctions where bidders bid with their demand or supply 
curves or schedules. The main advantage of multi-unit auctions is that they allow us to avoid the 
lumpy bid issue (Tenorio, 1993). However, there is great uncertainty about the best auction 
formats when multi-unit auctions are employed (Laury, 2002). The theory can only supply the 
structural properties of equilibrium strategies; however, the multiplicity of equilibria does not 
allow for comparisons across auction formats (see Martimort 2002 for a review). Empirical 
studies (Tenorio, 1999; Wolfram, 1998, List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000) and experiments (Kagel 
and Levin, 2001; Engelmann and Grimm, 2003) have improved our knowledge of multi-unit 
auctions but they remain scarce and most experiments are restricted to two bidders and two units. 
Moreover, they demonstrate that bidders have limited calculation capacities and learn from 
experience through repeated play instead of landing on the equilibrium strategies at the outset of 
the game.  
 
This study builds an agent-based model of a multi-unit auction to study the performance of 
alternative auction formats. Agent-based modeling (ABM) or agent-based computational 
economics (ACE) is a tool that is increasingly being used to complement theoretical and 
experimental studies in economics. Tesfatsion (2002) surveys the economics research areas in 
which ACE has been applied while Duffy (2004) examines the relationship between ACE and 
human-subject experiments in economics and provides an overview of studies using ACE to 
examine findings from human subject experiments. ACE is the study of artificial societies of 
interacting autonomous agents that directly emulate the behaviours of individuals, institutions and 
environmental components that make up the system being studied (Epstein and Axtell 1996 and 
Tesfatsion 2002). Unlike conventional or deductive approaches, the starting point in ACE is the   3
specification of agent attributes and behaviours rather than equations or equilibrium conditions 
describing the system under study. Therefore, ACE is suited to the study of systems where 
modelling outcomes can be gainfully enriched through the explicit incorporation of phenomena 
like agent heterogeneity, local interactions and networking, inductive learning, as well as through 
the relaxation of other restrictive assumptions that are normally imposed under conventional 
analysis for tractability purposes (Tesfatsion 2002). Studies applying ACE to the study of 
auctions include Andreoni and Miller (1995), Nicolaisen, Petrov and Tesfatsion (2001), Bower 
and Bunn (2001), Bunn and Oliveria (2001), Hailu and Schilizzi (2004). In our study, competing 
bidders submit continuous bid supply functions in the auction and employ reinforcement learning 
algorithms to update their bidding strategies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part, we describe the main issues associated with 
water auctions which have already taken place and we discuss the advantages of multi-unit 
auctions. We also review the various auction formats and the structural properties of equilibrium 
strategies. In the second part, we develop an agent-based model (ABM) where bidders are 
represented by software agents mimicking their attributes and behaviours (Hailu, Schilizzi and 
Thoyer, 2004): they have a boundedly rational and learn to improve their bidding strategy 
through repeated play using the Erev and Roth (1998) reinforcement learning algorithm.  In the 
third part, we conduct a number of computer-based experiments in order to compare equilibrium 
strategies, costs and efficiency, in the following three alternative sealed-bid auction formats: the 
uniform-price multi-unit auction; the discriminatory multi-unit auction; and the generalized 
Vickrey auction (Ausubel, 1997).  
 
We demonstrate that under the Ausubel format, simulated bids converge towards truthful bids as 
predicted by the theory and that bid shading is the rule for the uniform auction. However, the 
simulated bidding behavior under discriminatory pricing is different from what the theory 
expects, although it is in accordance with experimental results obtained by other authors. Our 
study allows us to assess the potential gains from agent-based modeling approaches in the 
assessment of the dynamic performance of multi-unit procurement auctions. We were able to 
assess changes in bidding behaviour accompanying changes in competition levels, and to 
compare the differences in bidding strategies among bidders with different opportunity cost (true 
supply curve) structures. We then draw some recommendations for the desirable format of water 
auctions.  
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1. Reverse multiple-bid auctions to re-allocate water entitlements 
 
1.1 Water auctions 
Increasing concerns regarding the environmental consequences of instream water scarcity have 
led a number of policy-makers to set-up water license buyback schemes. These schemes aim to 
reduce the consumptive use of water and increase environmental flows in times of drought. In the 
United States, auctions have been trialed as an alternative to other voluntary schemes such as 
posted prices. Auctions are expected to improve the efficiency of water curtailment and reduce 
budgetary expeditures through the minimization of information rents paid to farmers. 
 
The Georgia irrigation auction is one of the most interesting examples. The Flint River Drought 
Protection Act was enacted in April 2000. It requires that state authorities use an “auction-like 
process” to pay farmers to suspend irrigation in declared drought years. The Environmental 
Protection Division is required to assess the risks of an upcoming drought and to determine 
consequently the number of hectares, which must be taken out of irrigation to maintain acceptable 
instream flows. An auction is organized whereby farmers may offer to voluntarily forego 
irrigation of all land covered by a specific water-use permit for the remainder of the cultivation 
year in exchange for a lump sum payment. There is one single buyer, the State, and multiple 
sellers, the farmers. Pilot sessions were conducted within an experimental setting to assess and 
compare different auction designs: a discriminative-price auction, a uniform-price auction, an 
iterative uniform price auction as well as posted price offers (Cummings and al, 2002; Laury, 
2002). The target acreage is not public knowledge. A real case auction was finally conducted 
through the Internet in March 2001. It was set up as an iterative discriminative auction in which 
farmers were allowed to revise their offers after preliminary results were announced. The process 
continued until no one wished to submit a revised offer. Although the rate of participation was 
high, it was found that the iterative process had led to a substantial increase of payments to 
farmers and to inefficiencies, although the contrary was expected. Consequently, a revision of the 
auction format was planned.  
 
The San-Antonio auction (Texas) is a programme which seeks to acquire additional aquifer 
pumping rights by purchase or lease from irrigators West of san Antonio. The auction was held in 
April 2003, with the San Antonio Water Systems being the buyer and seeking to relieve short 
term scarcity issues. It was an ascending multi-unit auction. The auction was conducted in real-  5
time through the Internet, and bidders could re-evaluate and adjust a bid in response to other 
bidder’s offerings during the auction.  
 
It is also worth mentioning here the Deschutes water exchange in Oregon. The Deschutes 
Resources Conservancy (DRC) is a private nonprofit organization dedicated to stream flow 
restoration and water quality improvement in the Deschutes Basin. The water exchange 
programme was created in 2001 to foster an active market for water rights in order to promote 
efficient water use and restore depleted stream flows. The DRC started a payment scheme to 
provide incentives for the right holders to forego the use of all or a portion of their rights on an 
annual basis (used subsequently for instream use). The 2002 policy was based on a fixed price per 
acre-foot: participation was secured among small acreage landowners. The exchange considered 
using a reverse sealed-bid auction mechanism as part of its 2003 program.  
 
These examples highlight two important features about real world auction trials. First, that there 
is little guidance for policy-makers about the best auction formats. Formats so far employed vary 
from open format to sealed bid, from ascending uniform price auctions to iterative auctions with 
discriminatory payments. Second, all the trials share one common feature. All auctions were 
multi-unit, single-bid auctions: bidders were allowed to submit only one bid for a pre-defined 
quantity (either an acre of land or a price per cubic meter). They were not offered the option to 
submit a bid supply curve (i.e. a schedule of incremental quantity-price offers) . This raises the 
issue of lumpy bids, mentioned by Tenorio (1999) but also illustrated in the case of the auctioning 
of conservation contracts (Chan et al, 2003). If a landholder cannot submit several bids in order to 
obtain different rental fees for different parts of his/her land, and if marginal conservation costs 
tend to increase with the land area conserved, then landowners will avoid bidding for large areas 
of land. This is because the landholder would have to increase the bid with the size of the land 
offered (in order to properly reflect the average opportunity cost of the land), thereby reducing 
his/her chance of winning. The same problem is likely to arise with water buyback auctions: it is 
likely that farmers could choose to adopt water saving practices or technologies which could 
allow them to forego part of their entitlement at a reasonable cost, but that they would be more 
reluctant to give up irrigation altogether on large pieces of land since it would have a much higher 
cost in terms of foregone benefits. Therefore, if, say for monitoring reasons, bidders are only 
allowed to offer only one piece of land for withdrawal from irrigation, then water right holders 
are unlikely to offer large amounts of land. This phenomenon leads to lower participation, higher 
cost per unit of water recovered and lower efficiency because the auction exploits only   6
differences in the average costs of individual right holders, but not the differences in the marginal 
costs of alternative techniques or levels of water curtailment that can be undertaken by a 
particular right holder.  
 
One way to get around this issue of lumpy bid problem is to organize multi-unit auctions whereby 
farmers can actually submit a supply schedule rather than a single bid. The focus of this study is 
to examine the performance of alternative auction formats for auctions where sellers submit 
supply schedules represented as bid functions.  
 
1.2 Multi-unit auctions 
 
The theoretical literature on multi-unit auctions usually distinguishes between sequential and 
simultaneous auctions of several objects with bidders wanting more than one unit. In the case of 
water auctions, we concentrate on simultaneous procurement auctions, for multiple identical 
units, within a symmetric independent private value model. We therefore assume that the whole 
issue of affiliated or common values is not relevant in the case of water right buybacks since what 
counts for the farmer is the private cost associated with a reduction of his water entitlements.
1  
 
We also assume that the number of units that the auctioneer wishes to buy is fixed (as opposed to 
a budget constrained auctioneer or an auctioneer with a downward-sloping demand curve). Since 
most of the literature on multi-object multiple-bid auctions describes selling auctions, here we 
describe and summarize briefly what would be the equivalent predictions for a procurement 
auction in the case of a continuous rather than discrete bid specification. The continuous bid 
specification can be interpreted as one relating to the purchase of perfectly divisible units and was 
initially developed by Wilson (1979) who called it “auctions of shares”. 
 
There are two main options for buying multiple units simultaneously: open format auctions or 
sealed bid auctions. In the sealed bid auction, payments can be discriminatory, uniform or follow 
the generalized Vickrey rule. In the open format, we can have ascending auctions 
(discriminatory), descending auctions (uniform) or Ausubel (1997) auctions. The relation 
                                                 
1
Landholders or farmers will be different in their productivity levels and, therefore, in their values for water. This may 
not be the case in the rare circumstance where there is scope for alternative resale on a water market between private 
right-holders or when farmers have heterogeneous expectations concerning the severity of the upcoming drought and 
the resulting scarcity. 
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between sealed bid formats and corresponding open formats is theoretically one of outcome-
equivalence (Krishna, 2002). 
 
Table 1: Outcome equivalence for various formats of procurement multi-unit auctions and 
structural properties of equilibrium strategies 
 
Sealed-bid format  Open format  Structural property of equilibrium strategies 
and efficiency
2 
Discriminatory  Ascending clock  Scope for flat supply and for supply inflation 
Inefficient allocation 
Uniform-Price  Descending clock  Supply “inflation”




Coordination at a high price equilibrium 
Generalized Vickrey   Descending clock with 
clinched purchase  
(Ausubel, 1997) 
Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy 
Efficient allocation 
a Equivalent to demand reduction (or bid shading) in a selling auction 
b It is a weakly dominant strategy to bid one’s true value on the first unit then to start overbidding at an increasing rate. 
It therefore implies differential overbidding. Bidders with the same opportunity cost per unit increase their bids by 
different amounts according to the quantity they are offering to provide: the larger participants bid more than their 
smaller competitors for units with comparable unit costs.  
 
In sealed bid auctions, each bidder is asked to submit multiple bids indicating the price he is 
willing to accept for different quantities sold. In effect, these multiple bids are equivalent to an 
inverse supply function. In certain settings, bidders can be asked to submit a continuous supply 
schedule rather than discrete bids. To describe the allocation procedures in the different auction 
formats, we need to define the concept of residual demand. Let’s define the supply schedule of 
bidder i as  ) (b S Q
i i =  with b the per-unit bids. We can then define the residual demand facing 
bidder i,  ) (b D
i − , as the total demand Qd less the sum of the amounts offered by other bidders for 
each level of bid. 






− − =  
Each bidder is awarded the quantity 
i Q
* at which his supply schedule intersects his residual 
demand. 
*) ( *) (
* b S b D Q i i i = =
−  
However, the three formats differ in the calculation of the payments for the winners (see figure 1 
in appendix): 
                                                 
2 Efficiency here refers to the social opportunity cost of reallocated resources or water. An efficient 
reallocation is obtained when water is obtained from sources with the least opportunity cost for water.    8
-  in a discriminatory auction, each bidder is paid an amount equal to the sum of his actual 
winning bids (or the area under his supply schedule up to 
i Q
*  in the continuous case).   
-  in a uniform-price auction, all units sold are paid at the market-clearing price equating 
aggregate supply to demand. Therefore, infra-marginal winners receive payments that are 
higher than the production costs implied by their bid supply. 
-  in a generalized Vickrey auction, each bidder is paid for each unit sold the highest value 
of the corresponding losing bid. If he has won the first unit, he is paid the highest losing 
bid of his competitors on this first unit. For the second unit, he is paid the highest losing 
bid of his competitors on this second unit.  In a continuous case, where bidders would 
submit supply schedules rather than discrete bids, each successful bidder is paid the entire 




Equilibrium strategies, efficiency, and revenue 
 
For multiple-bid auctions, no closed form expressions of the bidding strategies are available in 
the general case and most authors have therefore focused on the structural properties of the 
equilibrium strategies. Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993), Englebrecht-Wiggans and Kuhn 
(1998), Tenorio (1999) and Ausubel and Cramton (2002), have analysed the outcomes of 
different multi-unit  auction formats and shown that the revenue equivalence theorem does not 
extend to the case of multiple-bid auctions.  
 
They demonstrate
3, using different but simplified auctions, the issue of bid shading (or demand 
reduction) associated with a uniform-price multiple-bid selling auction. Their findings agree: 
although it is a dominant strategy to bid truthfully for the first unit (or, in the continuous case, 
when quantity tends to zero), it is efficient for the bidders to shade their bids for additional units 
or quantities. Moreover, the amount of bid shading increases with quantities offered. “The reason 
for this differential shading is that the incentive to win units at any price below marginal value is 
offset by the incentive to reduce the price paid on infra-marginal units that are won anyway” 
(Ausubel and Cramton, 2002, p23). The latter becomes increasingly important when quantities 
increase, which explains the increasing bid shading. The consequence is that bids no longer 
                                                 
3 All demonstrations are made for a model where bidders’ values are private and independently distributed, and ex-ante 
symmetric (the distribution of information is uniform across bidders in the pre-auction situation). Since we only 
consider a private values environment, any equilibrium in the sealed bid format is outcome equivalent to an equilibrium 
of the corresponding open auction 
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correlate with opportunity costs, leading to efficiency losses. All demonstrations can be carried 
over with no restriction to the procurement case. This phenomenon has been verified empirically 
by Wolfram (1998) who conducted an econometric analysis of “supply inflation” in the electricity 
procurement auction in England and Whales.  
 
It is also demonstrated that there is an incentive, in a discriminatory format, to submit flatter 
supply curves than in a uniform price auction. If bidders are risk neutral, submitting entirely  flat 
supply curves is a possible equilibrium  (Back and Zender, 1993), although drastic demand 
reduction is also a possible outcome, especially when the difference in marginal values is high 
(Englebrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998; Krishna, 2002) . Since there are different classes of 
equilibrium strategies, it is difficult to analyse how bidders coordinate or even compare the 
efficiency of the two formats. Tenorio (1993) compares the discriminatory and uniform price 
auction formats in the Zambian foreign exchange market, which successively implemented the 
two. He demonstrates that the uniform price auction yields higher average revenue to the 
auctioneer. His case study includes some form of affiliated values, however.  
 
Only in the generalized Vickrey payment or its counterpart in the open format (i.e. the ascending 
auction with “clinched” quantities designed by Ausubel (1997)) is truthful bidding a weakly 
dominant strategy, resulting in efficient allocation. On the other hand, for uniform and 
discriminatory formats, only increased competition can lead to the reduction of strategic 
behaviour and to more truthful bidding (Ausubel and Cramton, 1996; Swinkels 1999). The 
generalized Vickrey is more complex and has not been employed in practice. It would be very 
useful to how the familiar formats compare with it and the extent to which the relative 





One way to circumvent the unavailability of predictive analytical results is to turn to experimental 
methods.  Experiments can be designed to confirm theoretical results but their function can also 
be to carry a problem beyond the analytical capabilities of theoretical analysis or to fill a void 
when theory is incomplete or not available (Hailu and Schilizzi, 2003). 
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Given both the weakness of the theory on multiple-bid auctions and the increasing use of such 
auctions in economic life, a growing number of researchers have tried to investigate bidding 
behaviour with laboratory experiments. Alemgeest, Noussair and Olson (1998) demonstrate that, 
in the two unit case, an ascending clock auction generates less revenue than the uniform sealed-
bid auction, due to strategic bid shading. Kagel and Levin (2001) also compare uniform-price 
sealed bid and open ascending auctions, with a real player with flat demand for two units playing 
against a robot with unit demand. Their findings also highlight the issue of demand reduction and 
show that in the open format, bids converge towards equilibrium values more rapidly than in a 
sealed bid format, as if "clock could enhance learning". They confirm that the Ausubel format 
leads to truthful bidding.  
 
Engelmann and Grimm (2003) compare bidding behaviour under five auctions formats and for a 
case where two bidders with flat demand curves compete to buy two units. Their experiments 
demonstrate that demand reduction is more acute in uniform open than in uniform sealed bid 
auctions, and that the Ausubel format eliminates bid shading. They also find that, in clear contrast 
to the theoretical prediction, bidders in discriminatory auctions place substantially different bids 
on the first and second unit, even when their valuations for the two units are close. They suspect 
that it might be due to myopic zero profit aversion of the bidders but do not prove it.  
 
All these experiments are conducted in extremely simplified settings. Human experiments can 
also be extremely costly and complicated to run when exploring issues such as competition or 
heterogeneity amongst bidders.  One way to deal with these difficulties is to employ 
computational or in silico experiments, conducted with autonomous “artificial” agents interacting 
in artificial societies (Tesfatsion, 2002). The starting point of such agent-based models is the 
specification of agent attributes and behaviors rather than equations relating system level 
variables to describe the dynamics of the system. In the field of auctions, such simulations have 
already been conducted to study electricity markets (Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Dunn and Oliveira, 
2001; Bower and Dunn, 2001) and to compare learnt and optimal bids in the context of single bid 
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2. The modelling of bidding strategies 
 
2.1 Structure of agent based model 
 
Our auction model has a population of agents selling water in a sealed-bid auction to a single 
buyer, the government agent. The government agent has a target or demand level for water 
purchases. Each seller is characterized by a (true) water supply function and a capacity indicating 
the maximum amount of water it has for sale. The water supply function represents the marginal 
value or opportunity cost of water to the seller and we assume that it is a non decreasing function 
of the amount of water given up. In the case of water, this maximum capacity would be equal to 
the bidders current water entitlement. The government agent does not know the true water supply 
functions of the different bidders and makes selection based on submitted or declared water 
supply bid functions. Over time, sellers learn to choose supply bid functions that maximize their 
expected net incomes.  
 
Each auction round involves two stages. In the first stage, the government collects bid functions 
from the sellers and calculates the residual demand for each bidder and determines the 
equilibrium quantities bought from each of them at the intersection of their bid supply and their 
residual demand. In the second stage, payments to individual bidders are determined according to 
the auction format in use. See section 1.2 and Figure 1 in appendix for a description of how 
payments are determined in the different auction types. Sellers use the results of the auction to 
compute their net incomes and to update the probabilities with which they choose their bid 
strategies for the next round. The strategy choice probabilities of a bidder therefore depend on his 
opportunity costs (true water supply function) as well as on the history of choices he has made 
and rewards obtained for those choices.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the true water supply function of all a sellers i is 
linear and can be written as:  
i i i i Q b a P
0 0 + =   with i i ms Q≤ ≤ 0 ,  where msi is the maximum water capacity of bidder I 
(equivalent to his water entitlement) 
 
The model is built for a heterogeneous population of eight sellers with the water supply capacity, 
intercept and slope parameters indicated in Table 2. Capacity takes either of two values, namely, 
0.25 and 0.75. The intercept parameter  0
i a can be either 0.25 or 0.75 while the slope parameter 
0
i b can be 0.25 or 0.75. No two bidders are identical. The intercept parameter is the entry price,   12
and reflects the fixed cost of giving up water. The maximum price (Max Price) is the price 
required by the seller when selling  his whole entitlement msi .  
 









(true entry price) 
True slope 
parameter(b
0)  Max price 
Seller 1  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.3125 
Seller 2  0.75  0.25  0.25   0,4375 
Seller 3  0.25  0.25  0.75  0,4375 
Seller 4  0.75  0.25  0.75  0,8125 
Seller 5  0.25  0.75  0.25  0,8125 
Seller 6  0.75  0.75  0.25  0,9375 
Seller 7  0.25  0.75  0.75  0,9375 
Seller 8  0.75  0.75  0.75  1,3125 
 
 
From table 2, we can see that sellers 7 and 8 have the highest marginal costs of supply for all 
quantities whereas players 1 and 2 have the lowest marginal costs and will therefore have many 
more opportunities to be selected in a competitive bidding process. 
 
 
2.2 Seller choice strategies 
 
 
We make the assumption that the learnt bidding curve is also linear and can therefore be written: 
i i i i Q b a P + =  with  ) ( i i Q β the strategic bid of player i 
There are therefore two dimensions to the seller’s choice strategy: intercept choice (ai) and slope 
choice (bi). The learning algorithm described in 2.3 will allow bidders to progressively explore 
different combinations of a and b and to retain the best values based on the performance of past 
bids.  Intercept and slope choices are discretized into ten steps. For the intercept, for example, the 
seller has ten choices 0, 0.1, 0.2, … ,1.0. For the slope parameter, there is a choice of ten values 
equally spaced between 0 and the maximum slope value implied by the constraint discussed 
below. The true intercept and slope parameters are included in the choice sets to allow for truthful 
revelation of supply function parameters. 
 
A constraint is imposed on the choice of strategies so that the chosen bid function does not have 
any section falling below the true cost function. This is guaranteed by restricting the allowed or 
feasible parameter choices (a and b) as shown in Figure 1. The constraints imposed are: 1) that   13
the learnt supply curve should not fall below the true supply curve; and 2) that the relevant 
marginal price for any bidder is not more than a certain proportion (maxPF, or maximum price 
factor) of the marginal cost of supply of the most expensive unit by the most expensive supplier 
(maxP). In this case, max PF is set to 3 (with maxP  the marginal price of the last unit supplied by 
seller 8, or 1.325) The first constraint was included to ensure that the learnt supply curve does not 












2.3 The learning algorithm    
 
Different learning models have been developed over the last several decades. A typology of 
learning models presented by Camerer (2003) shows the relationship between these learning 
algorithms and how certain variants can be obtained as special cases of others. The models differ 
in terms of their information requirements or assumptions. The reinforcement-learning algorithm 
is chosen for this study as it is particularly suitable for modelling bidding behaviour without 
a choice 
b choice
a + b.ms ≤ maxPF.maxP 
a
o ≤ a 
  a + b.ms ≥ a
o + b
o.ms   14
requiring that players be knowledgeable about forgone payoffs associated with strategies that they 
did not select.  
 
The reinforcement-learning algorithm was developed by Roth and Erev (1995) based on the 
reinforcement principle that is widely accepted in the psychology literature. Erev and Roth (1998) 
extend and use this learning algorithm to model behaviour from 12 experimental studies
4 of 
repeated games with unique nontrivial equilibria in mixed strategies. They find that the 
reinforcement learning model’s predictions of the choices of experimental subjects generally 
outperform equilibrium predictions. The Roth-Erev algorithm or modified versions of it have 
been used in agent-based studies of electricity auction markets (e.g. Nicolaisen et al 2001; Bunn 
and Oliveira, 2001).   
 
The Roth-Erev learning algorithm is based on the following four principles rooted in the 
psychology of learning (Erev and Roth 1998): the law of effect, the power law of practice, 
experimentation and recency. The law of effect asserts that the tendency to choose an action is 
strengthened (reinforced) or weakened depending upon whether the action produces favourable 
results or not. This principle implies that choice behaviour is probabilistic. The power law of 
practice refers to the fact that learning curves tend to be initially steep. Experimentation (or 
generalization) implies that strategies that are similar to previously chosen successful ones will 
be employed more often. Experimentation prevents players from quickly being locked into 
particular choices. Recency (or forgetting) requires that recent experience has more impact on 
behaviour than past experience. 
 
The main features of the algorithm can be described using the following three equations. If the 
propensity of player i to choose strategy (a,b)) at time t is denoted by  ) (t q ab
i , the propensity 
updating function can be written as (Erev and Roth 1998, p. 863): 
) 1 ( ) , , ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( R b a E t q t q cd ab
i
ab
i + − = + φ  
 where:  φ  is the recency parameter, R is the reward or reinforcement from previous choice of 
strategy  (c,d)and is the payment above true supply function obtained by the seller, while 
Ecd(a,b,R) is the following three step generalization function
5: 
 
                                                 
4 Eleven of these games were conducted by different researchers in the period between 1960 and 1995.  
5 For strategy sets without linear order, the generalization function should be specified as a two-step 
function. See Erev and Roth (1998, p. 863).   15
 
 
   =   R ( 1 - ε)   if a = c and b= d 
Ecd (a, b, R)     = R. (ε/2)  if (a, b) is neighboring strategy of (c,d) 
   =   0      otherwise 
 
where ε  is an experimentation parameter (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Generalization (experimentation) with Moore Neighbours. 
 
 
The probability that player i uses his (c,d) strategy is then given by: 
) 3 (
) (
) ( ) (
t q








Therefore, this learning algorithm has three parameters, namely, the recency parameter, the 
experimentation parameter as well as a scale parameter (s) that determines the initial 
propensities
6. The values of these parameters that provided the best data for the 12 games studied 
                                                 
6 The initial propensity for any given strategy is set as the product of the scale parameter and an expected 




Neighbours of (c,d) 
a choice 
b choice   16
in Erev and Roth (1998) were used in this study. These values are 0.1, 0.2 and 9, respectively. 
Our experiments with alternative values for these parameters show that the convergence between 
theoretical and learnt bids is insensitive to the values of these parameters.  
 
3. Simulation results, comparative statics and discussion 
 
The model was used to conduct experiments at five different levels of demand, namely, 0.1, 0.5, 
1, 2, and 3 units, and for the three auction formats (generalized Vickrey, discriminatory and 
uniform price). Compared to the aggregate or total capacity of 4.0 units offered by the 8 bidders, 
these demand levels cover a wide range of competition levels (from 2.5% to 75%). The relative 
performance of the different auctions depends on the level of this competition as discussed below. 
Difference in auction results becomes more important as the demand level increases.  
 
In all the experiments, bidder agents start with randomly selected bids and adjust their bids over 
the auction rounds. To ensure convergence, 5000 rounds were conducted for each auction. The 
results converge to their final values much earlier that the 5000
th round. However, discussions 
below are based on the results form the 5000
th round.  For each auction case (demand level and 
auction format), 100 replication with different random seeds were run. Results discussed here are 
based on the averages of these replications. 
 
Expected results 
As discussed in Section 1.2, the theory helps us characterize the structural properties of 
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Since learning involves two parameters, a good measure of the deviation of the learnt values from 
the true values is the Euclidean distance between the two pairs. The deviation of learnt from true 
supply parameter values is smallest in the case of the Vickrey auction, at all demand levels (See 
Table 3), which confirms the truthful revelation mechanism nature of this format. This deviation 
is highest under the discriminatory auction where bidders learn to alter their entry prices and 
supply slopes. Uniform auctions lead to strategic biases but they are less dramatic than in the case 
of discriminatory auctions.  
 
It is useful to note that for low levels of demand, corresponding to high competition, only the 
lowest marginal cost bidders (bidders 1 and 2) are selected and are therefore offered an 
opportunity to learn. Even for a level of demand of 2 (auction presented in table 4), sellers 5 and 
6 are rarely selected in the successive bidding processes. This is reflected in table 4d which 
highlights that highest opportunity cost sellers (sellers 8, 7, 6 and 5) rarely succeed in selling their 







True supply curve; 
expected under Vickrey
Supply curve expected under 
discriminatory auction 
Supply curve expected under 
uniform auction 
Qi 
Pi   18
Table 3a: Average Euclidian distance of learnt intercept and slope parameter pair from true 
parameter values when demand is 2 (50% of capacity).  
Sellers  Generalized Vickrey   Discriminatory auction  Uniform auction 
Seller  1  0.83 0.98 1.07 
Seller  2  0.47 0.84 0.62 
Seller  3  0.83 1.35 0.82 
Seller  4  0.42 0.81 0.66 
Seller  5  0.65 1.51 0.62 
Seller  6  0.27 0.73 0.93 
Seller  7  0.92 1.67 0.88 
Seller  8  0.74 1.43 0.97 
Average  0.64 1.17 0.82 
 
Table 3b: Average Euclidian distance of learnt intercept parameter from true intercept value when 
demand is 2  
Sellers  Vickrey auction  Discriminatory auction  Uniform auction 
Seller  1  0.11 0.46 0.19 
Seller  2  0.10 0.42 0.17 
Seller  3  0.10 0.46 0.18 
Seller  4  0.11 0.49 0.16 
Seller  5  0.03 0.27 0.06 
Seller  6  0.03 0.31 0.04 
Seller  7  0.02 0.26 0.04 
Seller  8  0.04 0.04 0.04 
Average  0.07 0.34 0.11 
 
Table 3c: Average of learnt slope parameter  from true slope value when demand is 2  
Sellers  Vickrey auction  Discriminatory auction  Uniform auction 
Seller  1  3.51 2.02 4.34 
Seller  2  0.50 0.50 0.65 
Seller  3  3.20 3.48 2.66 
Seller  4  0.39 0.28 0.70 
Seller  5  3.00 6.20 2.84 
Seller  6  0.40 0.38 1.78 
Seller  7  4.17 5.89 3.68 
Seller  8  1.20 2.40 1.54 
Average  2.05 2.64 2.27 
 
Table 3d: Average quantities supplied by  bidders as % of their own capacity when demand is 2 .  
Sellers  Vickrey auction  Discriminatory auction  Uniform auction 
Seller 1  76  88  72 
Seller  2  73.3 84 70.7 
Seller 3  76  80  80 
Seller  4  69.3 62.7 61.3 
Seller 5  60  28  68 
Seller 6  32  24  29.3 
Seller 7  36  28  52 
Seller 8  9.3  26.7  13.3 
Average 54  52.7  55.8 
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The range of learnt parameters does not exactly match the theoretical predictions but confirm a 
number of hypotheses (See Tables 4 and 5). First of all, the Vickrey auction and the uniform price 
auctions lead to comparable results, although on average the generalized Vickrey leads to slightly 
more sincere bidding than the uniform format. It is interesting to note that in both formats, 
bidding on the first unit is almost truthful, which is consistent with theory, but that sellers with 
low capacity display very aggressive overbidding strategies on the following units whereas   
sellers with a high capacity display almost  sincere bidding on all units. This is not predicted by 
theory and deserves further investigation. 
 
For discriminatory auctions, the average learnt entry price is clearly above the true entry price; 
however, the phenomenon of the “flatter supply” is not  verified. They all display overbidding 
strategies where both the entry prices and payments required for additional units are inflated. This 
confirms the results by Englebrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998).  
 
These tendencies are more clearly marked when the level of competition declines. Bid shading 
increases slightly for Vickrey and uniform auctions, although strategies under the Vickrey auction 
remain closer to sincere bidding than strategies under uniform price. However, the discriminatory 
auction displays unexpected results: learnt entry prices are very high whereas the overbidding on 
following units is reduced.  
 
Table 4: Learnt versus true supply parameters when demand is 2 (50% of capacity). 
Vickrey auction  Discriminatory auction  Uniform auction 
Sellers 
Ratio of 































Seller  1  1.54 4.14 3.49 2.71 1.92 4.05 
Seller  2  1.65 2.05 3.48 1.56 2.03 2.34 
Seller  3  1.57 1.94 3.47 1.56 1.95 1.83 
Seller  4  1.58 1.32 3.52 1.00 1.86 1.50 
Seller  5  1.11 3.30 1.63 4.35 1.14 3.39 
Seller  6  1.12 2.07 1.67 1.07 1.14 4.67 
Seller  7  1.11 1.99 1.62 1.65 1.12 2.24 
Seller  8  1.10 1.94 1.11 2.88 1.11 2.28 
Average 1.35  2.34  2.50  2.10  1.53  2.79 
Expected 
1  =1  =1  >1  ?  =1  >1 
1 see Table 3. 
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Table 5: Learnt versus true supply parameters when demand is 3 (75% of capacity). 


























Seller 1  2.80  5.28  5.69  3.09  2.88  6.10 
Seller 2  3.05  2.09  5.85  1.49  3.11  2.43 
Seller 3  2.66  2.50  5.71  1.46  2.87  2.65 
Seller 4  2.63  1.26  5.79  0.67  2.92  1.33 
Seller 5  1.37  3.50  2.24  1.20  1.47  3.93 
Seller 6  1.43  1.98  2.30  0.65  1.54  2.56 
Seller 7  1.33  1.67  2.24  0.67  1.42  1.72 
Seller 8  1.23  1.67  2.28  0.57  1.31  2.04 
Average  2.06  2.49  4.01  1.22  2.19  2.85 
Expected 






The overall outcomes of the auction can be judged using different criteria. From the policy 
maker’s point of view, both budgetary costs and allocative efficiency are important. Table 6 
shows that for very high levels of competition, the three auctions perform almost identically. 
However, when competition is less acute, we observe larger discrepancies between auctions, with 
discriminatory auctions displaying  bad performance indicators and uniform auctions. When 
competition is really low (demand = 75% of aggregate supply), the three formats perform equally 
bad, with  high budgetary outlays paid by unit of water..  
 
Table 7 shows the performance of auctions relative to the full information case. The Vickrey 
auction exhibits least distortion from outcomes obtained under truthful bidding, especially for low 
levels of competition whereas the uniform and discriminatory auctions might involve substantial 
misrepresentation of bid functions. 
We observe as well that if budgetary outlay is the decisive criterion, then discriminatory auctions 
perform well for high levels of competition, although it looses its budgetary savings advantage at 
higher levels of demand. At the highest demand level considered here, even the uniform auction 
entails payments per unit higher than those required under the Vickery auction. 
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Table 6: Performance of alternative auction formats under different demand levels: 































Vickrey  41.88%  0.269  0.029  0.007  0.258  0.037 
Discrim.  44.38%  0.370  0.031  0.008  0.260  0.051  0.1 
 
2.50% 
  Uniform  44.13%  0.350  0.035  0.009  0.261  0.089 
Vickrey  43.13%  0.374  0.227  0.057  0.291  0.163 
Discrim.  66.75%  0.728  0.261  0.065  0.332  0.190  0.5 
 
12.50% 
  Uniform  50.63%  0.561  0.281  0.070  0.305  0.256 
Vickrey  50.00%  0.516  0.634  0.159  0.351  0.283 
Discrim.  86.63%  0.874  0.794  0.198  0.413  0.380  1 
 
25.00% 
  Uniform  75.38%  0.748  0.748  0.187  0.391  0.356 
Vickrey  89.25%  0.855  1.802  0.450  0.502  0.399 
Discrim.  78.63%  1.225  1.982  0.496  0.485  0.484  2 
 
50.00% 
  Uniform  90.00%  0.925  1.850  0.463  0.512  0.413 
Vickrey  94.75%  1.350  4.540  1.135  0.603  0.902 
Discrim.  91.63%  1.912  5.036  1.259  0.621  0.967  3 
 
75.00% 
  Uniform  95.38%  1.498  4.535  1.134  0.602  0.896 
 
 
Table 7: Performance of alternative auction formats relative to full information case 































Vickrey  83.75%  1.036  1.125  1.125  1.012  5.282 
Discrim.  88.75%  1.425  1.220  1.220  1.022  NA  0.1 
 
2.50% 
  Uniform  88.25%  1.350  1.350  1.350  1.026  18.959 
Vickrey  86.25%  1.261  1.465  1.465  1.063  4.481 
Discrim.  133.50%  2.452  1.910  1.910  1.214  NA  0.5 
 
12.50% 
  Uniform  101.25%  1.891  1.891  1.891  1.117  10.916 
Vickrey  100.00%  1.424  1.506  1.506  1.172  2.334 
Discrim.  173.25%  2.411  2.646  2.646  1.378  NA  1 
 
25.00% 
  Uniform  150.75%  2.063  2.063  2.063  1.305  5.702 
Vickrey  89.25%  1.129  1.152  1.152  1.239  1.058 
Discrim.  78.63%  1.619  2.447  2.447  1.198  NA  2 
 
50.00% 
  Uniform  90.00%  1.222  1.222  1.222  1.263  1.175 
Vickrey  94.75%  1.566  1.635  1.635  1.122  2.323 
Discrim.  91.63%  2.217  3.123  3.123  1.156  NA  3 
 
75.00% 
  Uniform  95.38%  1.737  1.753  1.753  1.120  2.757 
Note: the auction outcome under perfect information is given in Table 8 in the appendix. 
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Conclusions 
As management agencies around the world look for better ways of reallocating or allocating 
water, interest in mechanisms like procurement multiple-bid auctions is likely to grow. There 
have already been some applications of this mechanism. The potential benefits of alternative 
auction designs need to be studied.  
 
This paper considered three alternative auction types that could be employed in cases where 
sellers’ bids are in the form of supply schedules or bid functions rather than single quantity-bid 
pairs. Theoretical predictions regarding three multi-unit auctions, namely, generalized Vickrey, 
discriminatory and uniform prices, are first discussed. An agent-based model with eight sellers 
bidding to supply water is then used to study the performance of the three auctions under 
circumstances where bidders learn to change their bid supplies over time. The bidders learn over 
a strategy space with dimensions relating to the intercept and slope parameters of bid function. 
The comparison is undertaken for five different demand levels, ranging in magnitude from 2.5% 
to 75% of aggregate supplier capacity. 
 
Learnt bid supply functions are found to be closest to true ones for the Vickrey auction. The 
uniform auction comes second by this criterion and discriminatory auctions lead to extreme 
overbidding, especially for low levels of competition. 
 
Misrepresentations in declared (or submitted) bid supply functions mean that water purchase 
targets are not necessarily met using least cost sources of water. The Vickrey auction leads to 
reallocation of water with minimum opportunity cost. However, it is important to note that for 
very high levels of competition or very low levels of competition, the performance of the three 
auctions are in fact similar and if budget expenditures carry more weight than gains in allocative 
efficiency, then uniform auctions can be a better choice. Therefore, a careful assessment of the 
tradeoffs implied by the choice of auction type is necessary. The Vickrey auction is unfamiliar 
and more complicated. But the potential benefits it offers in minimizing social cost of reallocated 
water for all demand levels and budgetary outlay makes it an attractive format, especially when 
competition is not acute. This could happen in the case of very high demand, as would occur, for 
example, if there is a severe drought or when water can only be bought in a restricted area from a 
small number of potential suppliers. However, in most cases, auctions are organized to respond 
optimally to a forecasted deficit of water during the summer months: demand by the policy-maker 
is usually much lower than the aggregate potential supply of all farmers. In such case, the choice   23
of an auction format is less important. However, agencies in charge of water procurement might 
need to have standard auction formats in place. The results from our study point to the importance 
of tailoring the format to the intensity of demand that is likely to be most frequent. 
 
Finally, the model used here has focused on learnt supply curves that are linear. This simplified 
the modelling process and has allowed us to say more about the performance of alternative 
auctions than we could be based on the theory alone. However, it would be interesting to 
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APPENDIX 
Table 9: Performance of alternative auction formats under full information case (honest bidding): 
Multi-unit auctions with 8 bidders. 
 




























Vickrey  50.00% 0.260  0.026  0.006 0.255  0.007 
Discrim.  50.00% 0.260  0.025  0.007 0.254  0.000  0.1 
 
2.50% 
  Uniform  50.00% 0.260  0.026  0.007 0.254  0.005 
Vickrey  50.01% 0.297  0.155  0.039 0.274  0.036 
Discrim.  50.00% 0.297  0.137  0.034 0.273  0.000  0.5 
 
12.50% 
  Uniform  50.00% 0.297  0.149  0.037 0.273  0.023 
Vickrey  50.00% 0.362  0.421  0.106 0.300  0.121 
Discrim.  50.00% 0.362  0.300  0.075 0.300  0.000  1 
 
25.00% 
  Uniform  50.00% 0.362  0.363  0.091 0.300  0.062 
Vickrey  100.00% 0.757  1.565  0.391 0.405  0.377 
Discrim.  100.01% 0.757  0.810  0.203 0.405  0.000  2 
 
50.00% 
  Uniform  100.00% 0.757  1.514  0.379 0.405  0.351 
Vickrey  100.00% 0.862  2.777  0.694 0.538  0.388 
Discrim.  100.01% 0.862  1.612  0.403 0.537  0.000 
3 75.00%  Uniform  100.01% 0.862  2.587  0.647 0.538  0.325 
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